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Abstract 
The wide popularity of Android systems has been accompanied by increase in the number of 
malware targeting these systems. This is largely due to the open nature of the Android 
framework that facilitates the incorporation of third-party applications running on top of any 
Android device. Inter-process communication is one of the most notable features of the Android 
framework as it allows the reuse of components across process boundaries. This mechanism is 
used as gateway to access different sensitive services in the Android framework. In the Android 
platform, this communication system is usually driven by a late runtime binding messaging 
object known as Intent. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of Android Intents (explicit 
and implicit) as a distinguishing feature for identifying malicious applications. We show that 
Intents are semantically rich features that are able to encode the intentions of malware when 
compared to other well-studied features such as permissions. We also argue that this type of 
feature is not the ultimate solution. It should be used in conjunction with other known features. 
We conducted experiments using a dataset containing 7,406 applications that comprise of 1,846 
clean and 5,560 infected applications. The results show detection rate of 91% using Android 
Intent against 83% using Android permission. Additionally, experiment on combination of both 
features results in detection rate of 95.5%. 
Keywords: mobile malware, android, intent, smartphone security, static analysis 
1. Introduction 
Smartphones have emerged as popular portable devices with increasingly powerful computing, 
networking and sensing capabilities, and they are now far more powerful than early personal 
computers (PCs). In addition, their popularity has been repeatedly corroborated by recent surveys 
[1]. The combination of device capability and popularity has served to make them an attractive 
target for malware. Accordingly, malware is quickly permeating most popular Android-based 
applications markets. In the case of official applications market (Google Play), operators are 
generally more concerned about the security aspect of the software they distribute. For instance, 
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Google Play employs a review system to vet potentially dangerous applications [2]. Despite all 
these efforts, commercial surveys still report a large number of malicious applications attacking 
the Android markets. For instance, GData reported nearly half a million new Android malware in 
20153. More recently, new malware such as the BrainTest [3], have succeeded in infecting over 
half a million Android devices, targeting Google Play in particular. Many recent studies have 
resulted in a number of automated approaches to tackle the spread of malware [4] [5] [6] [7]. 
Static analysis techniques, which have traditionally been used for detecting malware targeting 
desktop computers, have recently gained popularity as effective measures for the protection of 
mobile applications [8]. In particular, static approaches aim at detecting Android malware by 
analyzing their permission usage [9], mining their code structures [10], understanding the 
components they used [11], and monitoring the APIs they invoked [11] [12] [13]. Inter-process 
communication is one of the most notable features of the Android framework as it allows the 
reuse of components across process boundaries. It is used as gateway to access different sensitive 
services in the Android framework. In the Android platform, this communication system is 
usually driven by a late runtime binding messaging object known as Intent. Intent objects 
provide an abstract definition of the operations an application intends to perform.  
The rich semantics encoded in this type of component indicate that Intent could be used to 
characterize malware. For instance, the listing in Table 1 shows an excerpt of Intent actions used 
in a legitimate banking application and the actions stipulated in the infected version of the same 
application. In this example, it is obvious that the infected version of the application is 
subscribing to a notification service that will be triggered by the Android OS whenever the 
BOOT_COMPLETED event occurs. In addition, SMS_RECEIVED allows the subscriber to 
access all incoming SMS messages [14]. While the former action is used by the malware as a 
form of evasion, the latter is used to steal the Transaction Authorization Code (TAC) [15] [16]. 
Table 1. Intent Section of Clean and Infected Versions of Zurich Cantonal Bank Application 
Clean Version Infected Version 
android.intent.action.MAIN 
android.intent.action.MAIN 
android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED 
android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED 
 
In this paper, we propose AndroDialysis4, a system that analyzes two different types of Intent 
objects, i.e.: implicit and explicit Intents. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed system, 
we will compare our results with that from a baseline detection system that uses similar level of 
granularity, and we will then analyze the permissions usage. In summary, we make the following 
contributions in this paper:  
1. We propose the use of Android Intents (implicit and explicit) for detecting Android 
malware. The usage of Intents will be extracted from both clean and infected applications 
in a dataset containing 7,406 applications.  
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2. We extract permissions used by each application and evaluate the effectiveness of our 
approach when compared to the use of permissions. We also conduct experiment on 
combination of Android permission and Android Intent to verify that they are not 
overlapping. 
3. We also compare the time taken to process permissions and Intents in our experiments, as 
it is important to determine which component of the Android file is faster and more 
efficient. Furthermore, we calculated power consumption of AndroDialysis and 
compared it with three popular applications. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains in detail Android Intent, and presents a 
snippet code for implicit and explicit Intents, respectively. Section 3 discusses the method of data 
collection and analysis of the dataset, analyzing the permission and Intent. Section 4 describes 
the proposed system and its various modules and sub-modules. Section 5 presents details of 
experiments and the results obtained, as well as evaluation of the proposed system. Section 6 
reviews related works done by other researchers, and highlights their weaknesses and strengths. 
Section 7 concludes this paper by summarizing main findings from this research.  
2. Android Intent 
Intent is a complex messaging system in the Android platform, and is considered as a security 
mechanism to hinder applications from gaining access to other applications directly. 
Applications must have specific permissions to use Intents. This is a way of controlling what 
applications can do once they are installed in Android. Intent-filter - defined in 
AndroidManifest.xml file - announces the type of Intent the application is capable of receiving.  
Applications use Intents for intra-application and inter-application communications. Intra-
application communication takes place inside an application between activities. An Android 
application consists of many activities, each referring to buttons, labels, and texts available on a 
single page of the application, with which the user interacts. When interacting with the 
application, the user moves from activity to activity (i.e. from page to page). Android Intents 
assist developers in performing interactions among the activities. Furthermore, Intents are used 
in pushing data from one activity to another, carrying the results at the end of any particular 
activity [17].  
Inter-application communication is achieved when applications send messages or data to other 
applications through Intent. The applications should also be able to receive data from other 
applications. To receive Intents, applications must define what type of Intent they accept in the 
Intent section of AndroidManifest.xml file, as intent-filter. Many past studies [18] [19] [20] 
referred to this type of Intent. The actual communication between two applications is done 
through the Binder, which handles all inter-process communications. The Binder provides the 
features for binding functions and data between one execution environment and another, as each 
Android application runs in its own Dalvik5 environment. The Intent mechanism is considered 
higher than Binder, hence, it is built on top of Binder.  
 
Figure 1. Inter-application Communication Using Android Intent and Binder 
Figure 1 shows the architecture of inter-application communication. The Binder driver manages 
part of the address space of each application and makes it as read-only and all writing is done by 
the kernel section of Android. When application A sends a message to application B, the kernel 
allocates some space in the destination applications memory, and copies the message directly 
from the sending application. It then queues a short message to the receiving application telling it 
the location of the received message. The recipient can then access that message directly because 
it is in its own memory space. When application B has finished processing the message, it 
notifies the Binder driver to mark the memory as free [21]. 
There are two types of Intent: explicit and implicit. When developers know exactly what 
component to use to perform a specific action, they use explicit Intent. This component can be 
any activity, service, or broadcast receiver. Explicit Intent is used for intra-application and inter-
application communications, and developers use this type of Intent to navigate from an activity 
to another activity inside applications, as well as to exchange messages between applications. 
For instance, there are some applications, which are used for browsing, such as the default 
browser on the device or Google Chrome. Developers use explicit Intent to request Android to 
open a link specifically using Google Chrome. On the other hand, developers use implicit Intent 
and ask Android to open a link, but they do not specify the exact target application. In response, 
Android offers a list of all applications capable of opening a link to the user. Such a list is 
populated based on the intent-filter section of AndroidManifest.xml files. In our study, our aim is 
to extract both implicit and explicit Intents and conduct a comprehensive evaluation of their 
effectiveness in malware detection. 
Intents have three components - action, category, and data. The action component describes what 
kind of action is to be executed by the Intent such as MAIN, CALL, BATTERY LOW, SCREEN 
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ON, and EDIT. Intents specify the category they belong to, such as LAUNCHER, 
BROWSABLE and GADGET. The data components provide the necessary data to the action 
component. For instance, CALL action requires phone number, and EDIT action needs 
document or HTTP URL to complete the action. Table 2 shows a sample code of explicit and 
implicit Intents. 
Table 2. Sample Code Snippet of Explicit and Implicit Intents 
Explicit Intent Implicit Intent 
String url=”www.yahoo.com”;  
Intent explicit=new Intent(Intent.ACTION_VIEW);  
explicit.setData(Uri.parse(url));  
explicit.setPackage(”com.android.chrome”);  
startActivity(explicit) 
String url=”www.yahoo.com”; 
Intent implicit=new Intent(Intent.ACTION_VIEW); 
implicit.setData(Uri.parse(url)); 
startActivity(implicit); 
 
Table 2 shows that implicit Intent uses Intent.ACTION_VIEW to open the specified URL. 
However, explicit Intent states the exact component name - in this case com.android.chrome - to 
open the URL. 
3. Data Collection and Analysis  
For our experiment, we used real-world applications that include both clean and infected 
applications. We gathered clean applications from Google Play6 and scanned them with 
VirusTotal7  to ensure the cleanness of the applications. The applications collected include both 
free and paid types since ProfileDroid [22] mentioned that paid applications behave differently 
from free ones, and it is important to include all such applications. Google Play applications are 
categorized into 27 main application categories, and games category has 17 sub-categories. We 
gathered samples from 24 main application categories, and 17 games sub-categories to cover a 
wide variety of applications, as shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Categories of Gathered Applications 
Books & References Medical Tools Games - adventure 
Business Weather Games - action Games - strategy 
Comics Travel Games - card Games - simulation 
Communication Photography Games - casino Games – family 
Education Productivity Games - casual Games – racing 
Entertainment Shopping Games - educational Games – sports 
Finance Social Games - music Games – arcade 
Health & Fitness Sports Games - puzzle  
Music & Audio Media & Video Games - role playing  
News & Magazines Transportation Games - word  
Personalization Live Wallpaper Games - board  
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The clean dataset contains 1,846 applications. Additionally, we used DREBIN [11] as infected 
dataset. It is a collection of 5,560 applications from 179 different malware families. We used our 
Python code to extract permission and Intent from applications in our dataset. The top 10 
permissions of both clean and infected applications are shown in Table 4. Google categorizes 
Android permissions into four groups - normal, dangerous, signature, and signatureOrSystem 
[23]. 
Table 4. Top 10 Permissions in Clean and Infected Applications 
Clean Applications Infected Applications 
Permissions Frequency Permissions Frequency 
INTERNET 98% INTERNET 98% 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 89% READ_PHONE_STATE 89% 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 83% WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 67% 
WAKE_LOCK 53% SEND_SMS 54% 
READ_PHONE_STATE 52% RECEIVE_SMS 38% 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 48% WAKE_LOCK 38% 
GET_ACCOUNTS 42% READ_SMS 37% 
VIBRATE 41% ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 32% 
BILLING 39% ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION 30% 
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 24% READ_CONTACTS 23% 
 
Table 4 also shows that five permissions are common - as highlighted - between clean and 
infected applications, such as, INTERNET, WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE, WAKE_LOCK, 
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, and READ_PHONE_STATE. However, these applications 
have five different permissions among the top 10 permissions. Infected applications request 
SEND_SMS, RECEIVE_SMS and READ SMS permissions, which are categorized as 
dangerous. In fact, WRITE_SMS, which is also dangerous, should be in the list of top frequent 
permissions. It is ranked 11th in our dataset, and it is requested by 22% of infected applications. 
Therefore, it is evident that infected applications request four SMS-related permissions to have 
full access to SMS functionality of the devices. In our experiment, 30% of infected applications 
requested the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission to access precise location, and 33% of 
them requested the ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION permission, which is a common 
permission, to access proximate location. In general, the viciousness of infected applications can 
be gauged through permissions. We also extracted Intent of applications, as shown in Table 5, 
which shows top 10 Intents used in clean and infected applications. It is worth noting that the 
VIEW Intent was removed from the top 10 Intents, since it is used in all clean and infected 
applications. 
Table 5. Top 10 Intents in Clean and Infected Applications 
Clean Applications Infected Applications 
Intents Frequency Intents Frequency 
SEND_MULTIPLE 45% BOOT_COMPLETED 56% 
SCREEN_OFF 23% SENDTO 45% 
USER_PRESENT 18% DIAL 42% 
SEARCH 17% SCREEN_OFF 37% 
PICK 10% TEXT 28% 
DIAL 9.5% SEND 27% 
GET_CONTENT 9% USER_PRESENT 22% 
EDIT 8.7% PACKAGE_ADDED 21% 
MEDIA_MOUNTED 8% SCREEN_ON 18% 
BATTERY_CHANGED 7% CALL 10% 
 
Malicious applications wait for BOOT_COMPLETED to start their malicious activity. CALL 
and DIAL are used for making phone calls. CALL requires CALL_PHONE permission, whereas 
DIAL does not require such permission. As it is presented in Table 5, DIAL is used more than 
CALL, which allows the malicious application to make a premium phone call without user’s 
knowledge. 
 
Figure 2. Percent of Applications That Request Specific Number of Permissions 
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 Figure 3. Percent of Applications That Request Specific Number of Intents 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of applications that requested permissions - clean and infected - in 
two datasets. The graph shows that infected applications request more permissions as there are 
spikes at multiple points in the figure. Furthermore, only 2% of clean applications requested 
between 35-55 permissions, compared to 7% of infected applications. This is indicative of the 
vicious intentions of infected applications. 
Similarly, Figure 3 shows the percentage of applications that requested Intents - implicit and 
explicit - in two datasets. When comparing Figure 2 and Figure 3, the difference between their    
X-axis is obvious. While permissions have maximum number of 55, number of Intents ends at 
250. The wide difference is due to the fact that developers use Intents much more frequently than 
permissions in the code to perform actions.  
Intent and permission are potentially useful features for Android malware detection. However, 
according to Moonsamy et al. [24], there are requested permissions as well as required 
permissions. It is possible that actual permissions used by applications are different from the 
requested permissions that is sent to the user for approval. On the other hand, Intent reflects the 
actual intentions of applications resulting directly from activities. This indicates that Intent is 
more effective for malware detection.  
4. Mobile Malware Detection System Overview 
Figure 4 shows the architecture for our proposed system, AndroDialysis. The top level of the 
architecture - Android application framework - refers to applications installed on the device. The 
detector module performs the main task of detection. It consists of four sub-modules - 
decompiler, extractor, intelligent learner, and decision maker. The system sends the results to 
users through the graphical user interface. The following sections describe four sub-modules in 
more detail. 
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 Figure 4. Overview of AndroDialysis, a Mobile Malware Detection System 
4.1. Decompiler 
The decompiler sub-module is responsible for dissecting the apk files and decoding its 
components. Every apk file has various components. AndroidManifest.xml is a scrambled file 
and needs to be decoded in order to make it readable. Similarly, the dex file is a Java source code 
compiled in Dalvik format and needs to be decompiled. After decompilation, the produced file is 
not a pure Java code, but it is easy to read. We used Apktool for decompiling Android files, since 
it utilizes the latest Android SDK, which is better in optimizing files [25]. Decompiling files 
results in readable AndroidManifest.xml file and generates Smali version of Java code.  
4.2. Extractor 
The extractor sub-module extracts explicit Intent, implicit Intent, intent-filter, and permission 
from Java code and AndroidManifest.xml file for processing in subsequent sub-modules. The 
BeautifulSoup package of the Python language is used to extract intent-filter and permission 
sections from the AndroidManifest.xml file [26]. In order to extract Intents from Java code, we 
used Androguard to reverse dex files and get Intents (implicit and explicit) from the code. The 
extracted data is stored in a features database for use in the next process. Furthermore, a copy of 
data is sent to the decision maker sub-module for determining maliciousness of the data, which 
will be discussed in section 4.4. 
4.3. Intelligent Learner 
This sub-module takes data from the features database and uses Bayesian Network algorithm to 
learn pattern of the data. It then sends output model to the decision maker sub-module. The 
Bayesian Network algorithm [27] was chosen to evaluate our system because it has been 
Decision Maker
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User Interface
Android Application Framework 
Features
Extractor
Permission
Intent-filter
Decompiler
dex file xml file
Implicit Intent
Explicit Intent
successfully used in real-world problems, for example Cohen et al. [28] used Bayesian Network 
in human facial expression recognition and achieved a good performance. It is a dual-process 
algorithm, it first learns network structure, and then it learns probability tables. Bayesian 
Network uses local score metrics to learn the network structure of data. It is considered an 
optimization problem in which the quality of the network is optimized. To calculate the local 
score, Bayesian Network employs search algorithms. Once the network structure of data has 
been learned, Bayesian Network utilizes estimators to learn the probability tables [29]. Two 
widely used estimators are simple estimator, and multinomial estimator. The aforementioned two 
steps are defined as follows:  
Suppose that 𝑉 =	 {𝑥!, …… . . , 𝑥"}, 𝑘	 ≥ 1 is a set of variables. Bayesian Network B over V is a 
network structure BS that is a directed acyclic graph known as DAG over the set of variables V. 
It is also a set of probability tables 𝐵#	 =	 .𝑝0𝑣2𝑝𝑎(𝑣)6|𝑣	 ∈ 𝑉9 where 𝑝𝑎(𝑣) is the set of parents 
of v in BS. Finally, a Bayesian Network represents a probability distribution                                                  𝑃(𝑉) = 	∏ 𝑝(𝑣|𝑝𝑎(𝑣))%∈' .  
Compared to other algorithms, the Bayesian Network has the following advantages: 
• It is a fast algorithm with low computational overhead once trained.  
• It has the ability to model both expert and learning systems with relative ease. It 
integrates probabilities into the system. It is also considered as a performance-tuning tool, 
but without incurring computational overhead.  
• Many outstanding real-world applications have used this algorithm and have performed 
comparably well against other state-of-the-art algorithms [29]. 
As mentioned above, Bayesian Networks are collections of directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), 
where the nodes are random variables, and where the arcs specify the independence assumptions 
between these variables. It is difficult to search the Bayesian Network that best reflects the 
dependence relationship in a database of cases because of the large number of possible DAG 
structures, given even a small number of nodes to connect. As a result, researchers have 
developed various search algorithms to overcome this problem. In this paper, we use four search 
algorithms for our experiments –K2, Geneticsearch, HillClimber, and LAGDHillClimber 
algorithms.  
K2 algorithm heuristically searches for the most probable belief network structure in a given 
database of cases, which includes different combinations of values for attributes [30]. 
Geneticsearch algorithm uses the genetic algorithm to find the optimum result in a Bayesian 
Network. The algorithm is based on the mechanics of natural selection and natural genetics. 
Although it is capable of solving complex problems, it is a time-consuming algorithm for some 
data (see Table 9) [31]. It combines survival of the fittest among string structures with a 
structured, yet randomized, information exchange to form a search algorithm that under certain 
conditions evolves into the optimum with a probability that is arbitrarily close to one [32].  
The HillClimber search algorithm starts learning by initializing the structure of Bayesian 
Network. Unlike previous algorithms that potentially get stuck in the search process, the Hill 
Climber solved that problem [33]. Each possible arc from any node is then evaluated using 
leave-one-out cross validation to estimate the accuracy of the network with that arc added. If no 
arc shows any improvement in accuracy, the current structure is determined. An arc that has the 
most improvement is retained, but the node the arc points to is removed. This process is repeated 
until there is just one node remaining, or no arc can further be added to improve the classification 
accuracy [34]. The LAGDHillClimber search algorithm uses a Look Ahead Hill Climbing 
algorithm. Unlike Hill Climber, it does not calculate a best arc (by adding, deleting or reversing 
an arc), but it considers a sequence of best arcs instead of considering the best arc at each step. 
Since it is very time-consuming to find the best sequence among all the possible arcs, it must 
first find a set of good arcs and then find the best sequence of arcs among them [35]. Such 
improvement over Hill Climber algorithm, results in better performance (see Table 6).  
We evaluate the performance of Bayesian Network using k-fold cross validation. In this method, 
the dataset is divided into k subsets, and the holdout method is repeated k times. Each time, one 
of the k subsets serves as the test set and the other k-1 subsets are compiled to form a training set. 
Then, the average error across all k trials is computed. The advantage of this method is that it 
matters less how the data is divided. Every data point gets to be in a test set exactly once, and in 
a training set k-1 times. The variance of the resulting estimate is reduced as k increases [6]. 
Specifically, a 10-fold option is used, which is described as applying the classifier to data 10 
times and every time the dataset is divided into 90:10 groups - 90% of data used for training, and 
10% used for testing, which is widely used among researchers [36]. At the end, this sub-module 
produces a model - based on available data in the features database - that is used for detection 
purpose. It is worth noting that the intelligent learner is constantly learning from the data added 
to the features database. 
 
4.4. Decision Maker 
The decision maker sub-module is responsible for determining whether the data is clean or 
malicious. It receives two sets of data from the extractor and the intelligent learner sub-modules. 
A set of data from the intelligent learner sub-module contains a produced model based on the 
collection of data in the features database. The model is then used to vet the data received from 
extractor sub-module. Another set of data that is received from the extractor sub-module contains 
extracted data of one application. The decision maker sub-module utilizes the model to 
determine the maliciousness of the application. The final decision is passed to the user interface 
module, which prepares appropriate message for the user and presents it through the graphical 
user interface, as shown in Figure 5. Such design of the decision maker sub-module ensures 
faster detection and higher performance, as it was adopted by Shabtai et al. [37].  
 Figure 5. Screenshot of the Results Presented to the User 
5. Results and Discussion 
In this section, we discuss our results and findings. It is important to restate that the purpose of 
this paper is to study the effectiveness of Android Intent (implicit and explicit) in malware 
detection, and not malware detection per se. We present the results from experiments conducted 
on permissions, Intents, and both in Android malware detection. Additionally, to get a better 
assessment of the current development of Android Intent, we analyzed our datasets.  
5.1. Intent Analysis and Attacks 
We analyze Intents in our datasets from the security standpoint to assess the current status or 
importance of Intents. As mentioned in section 2, implicit Intent does not specify its destination 
component. However, it is offered to entities that can receive specific type of Intent. Therefore, 
when an application sends an implicit Intent, there is no guarantee that the Intent will be received 
by the intended recipient. A malicious application can intercept an implicit Intent simply by 
declaring an intent-filter - in AndroidManifest.xml file - with all the actions, data, and categories 
listed in the Intent. This situation - unauthorized Intent receipt - causes the malicious application 
to gain access to all the data in any matching Intent, resulting in activity hijacking [38]. 
In our dataset, infected applications declare intent-filter 7.5 times more than clean applications. 
On an average, each clean application declares 1.18 intent-filters, whereas each infected 
application declares 1.61 intent-filters. Thus, it is evident that infected applications tend to 
intercept Intents using intent-filters until they succeed in hijacking the activities.  
In view of this threat, it is suggested that developers use explicit Intent so that the recipient is 
clearly specified in order to hinder malicious applications from hijacking the activities. We have 
analyzed our dataset with regard to this threat, and found that 28.78% of Intents used were 
implicit and 71.22% were explicit. In general, developers are doing what is appropriate; 
nevertheless, it is essential to stay vigilant, as attackers are known to change their attack plan 
frequently. 
5.2. Experimental Results 
This experiment was performed on a Sony Xperia Z3 Compact device, model D5803. It is 
running Android Marshmallow, version 6.0.1 with latest updates. The device has 2GB of RAM 
and 16GB of storage.  
We aim to answer the following research questions. A. Is Intent a plausible feature for Android 
malware detection? B. What are best configurations in Bayesian Network that produce the best 
results? C. How effective is Android Intent compared to Android permission?  
5.2.1. Effectiveness 
We employed Bayesian Network with different configurations for our experiment. As discussed 
earlier, Bayesian Network uses a search algorithm for calculating the local score metrics, and an 
estimator algorithm for learning the probability table. In order to achieve the best results, we 
experimented with different configurations, and the results are presented in Table 6. The table 
shows results of permission and Intent with simple estimator and multinomial estimator 
algorithms; and K2, Geneticsearch, HillClimber, and LAGDHillClimber as search algorithms. 
 
 
Table 6. Results of Android Permission and Android Intent Experiments 
 Android Permission Android Intent 
 Simple Estimator Multinomial Simple Estimator Multinomial 
 TPR FPR TPR FPR TPR FPR TPR FPR 
K2 82% 18% 24% 76% 89% 11% 19% 81% 
Geneticsearch 83% 17% Null Null 91% 9% Null Null 
HillClimber 82% 18% 24% 76% 89% 11% 19% 81% 
LAGDHillClimber 83% 17% Null Null 91% 9% Null Null 
 
The results of experiments reflect the performance of our method. Detection rate, also known as 
a true positive rate (TPR), is the probability of correctly detecting an instance as a malware. On 
the other hand, false positive rate (FPR) is another measurement that is defined as wrongly 
detecting normal traffic as being infected. The higher the TPR, the better is the result. 
Conversely, the lower the FPR, the better is the result. The best results are obtained by 
combining a simple estimator and Geneticsearch; and a simple estimator and LAGDHillClimber 
- both combinations achieving 83% true positive rate. We conducted our experiment in 30 
iterations. As the number of iterations goes up, the system learns the pattern of the data more 
accurately. Figure 6 shows the true positive rate and the false positive rate for each iteration of 
the experiment. 
 
Figure 6. True Positive Rate versus False Positive Rate for 30 Iterations 
Figure 6 shows that true positive rate increases from just above 80% to 90% as number of 
iterations goes up. However, false positive rate does not follow the same rate of increase as the 
true positive rate. It starts from 6% and increases to 9%, which is considered as a good result, 
considering that the true positive rate increases by 10%.  
Additionally, we conducted experiments for each malware family to assess effectiveness of 
Android Intent for an individual family. The results are tabulated in Table 7. The experiments are 
conducted on families with highest number of malware samples in our dataset. Since our 
previous results with multinomial algorithm were not encouraging, we use simple estimator for 
this experiment. The lowest detection rate belongs to DroidKungfu family. This malware gains 
root access in the device and installs an application called legacy that pretends to be a legitimate 
Google Search application bearing the same icon. The DroidKungfu then performs its malicious 
activities through the legacy application [39]. We believe that such strategy makes it trickier to 
detect, since malicious activities are performed by an agent application other than the main one. 
Other malware families show relatively high to high detection results.  
Table 7. The results of Android Intent Experiments for Each Malware Family 
 K2 Geneticsearch HillClimber LAGD HillClimber 
Number 
of 
malwares 
FakeInstaller TPR 85.78% 84.02% 84.91% 84.02% 925 FPR 14.21% 15.97% 15.08% 15.97% 
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DroidKungFu TPR 76.41% 76.14% 76.41% 76.14% 667 FPR 23.58% 23.85% 23.58% 23.85% 
Plankton TPR 79.59% 79.59% 79.34% 79.54% 625 FPR 20.40% 20.40% 20.65% 20.45% 
Opfake TPR 93.06% 93.06% 92.76% 93.06% 613 FPR 6.93% 6.93% 7.23% 6.93% 
GinMaster TPR 77.35% 77.35% 77.15% 77.58% 339 FPR 22.64% 22.64% 22.84% 22.41% 
BaseBridge TPR 81.96% 81% 83% 80.17% 330 FPR 18.03% 19% 17% 19.82% 
Iconosys TPR 76.74% 76.87% 76.74% 76.87% 152 FPR 23.25% 23.12% 23.25% 23.12% 
FakeDoc TPR 81.89% 81.65% 81.89% 81.65% 132 FPR 18.10% 18.34% 18.10% 18.34% 
Geinimi TPR 87.39% 87.39% 79.91% 80.55% 92 FPR 12.60% 12.60% 20.08% 19.44% 
 Total 3,875 
 
It is necessary to verify that Android Intent is in fact an effective feature, and our results are not 
just a fluke. Therefore, we conduct experiments using both features – Android permissions and 
Android Intents. This is essential to show that the features are not overlapping, and Android 
Intent can really increase the detection rate. Table 8 represents results of experiments on 
combination of Android Permissions and Android Intents. Not only are the results show that 
Android Intent - explicit and implicit - is an effective feature, it also boosts other features - i.e. 
Android permissions - in malware detection. 
It is worth noting that the choice of Android permissions in this study is based on the fact that 
this feature has been widely explored and its importance and effectiveness has been established. 
Feizollah et al. [40] conducted an extensive study on Android features. Among static features, 
Android permissions are the most used features. Various approaches have been taken to analyze 
Android permissions. Authors of [41], [42], [43], [44] used permissions to evaluate applications 
and rank them based on possible risk. Numerous studies simply extracted permissions and 
utilized machine learning to detect malicious application, [45], [46], [47],[48]. Researchers in 
[49], [50] argue that merely analyzing requested permissions is not sufficient for detecting 
malicious applications. They analyzed used permissions in addition to requested permissions in 
order to detect malware. AppGuard [51] has gone one step further and has extended Android’s 
permission system to alleviate current vulnerabilities. They claim that their system is a practical 
extension for Android permission system as it is possible to use it on devices without any 
modification or root access. As a result, Android permissions is a strong candidate for this paper 
in order to compare it with Android Intents.   
Table 8. Results of Experiments Using Both Permissions and Intents 
 Simple Estimator 
 TPR FPR 
K2 95.5% 4.4% 
Geneticsearch 95.4% 4.5% 
HillClimber 95.5% 4.4% 
LAGDHillClimber 95.4% 4.5% 
 
5.2.2. Efficiency 
Besides evaluating the effectiveness of our system, we calculated the time taken by each 
combination to produce the results, as shown in Table 9. 
Table 9. Time Taken to Produce Results (seconds) 
 Android Permission Android Intent 
 Simple Estimator Multinomial Simple Estimator Multinomial 
K2 0.06 0.89 0.01 0.07 
Geneticsearch 2.86 Null 0.91 Null 
HillClimber 0.02 0.87 0.01 0.07 
LAGDHillClimber 0.05 Null 0.05 Null 
 
Based on Table 9, results in Android permission are produced faster when the simple estimator 
and HillClimber are combined. With regard to Android Intent, combining the simple estimator 
with LAGDHillClimber achieved true positive rate of 91% in less time than Geneticsearch.  
In addition, we show the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve for the best results of 
permission and Intent. The ROC curve is normally used to measure performance in detecting 
intrusions. It indicates how the detection rate changes, as the internal threshold is varied to 
generate more or fewer false alarms. It plots intrusion detection accuracy against false positive 
probability. ROC curves signify the tradeoff between false positive and true positive rates, which 
means that any increase in the true positive rate is accompanied by a decrease in the false 
positive rate. As the ROC curve line is closer to the left-hand border and the top border, it 
indicates that it produces the best results among other curves. The ROC curves for Android 
permission and Android Intent are shown in Figure 7. 
 Figure 7. ROC Curve for Android Permission and Android Intent 
The ROC curves are difficult to compare, as they seem to be almost similar under some 
situations, therefore, the area under the curve (AUC) is used to measure the accuracy of 
detection. An area of 1 means a perfect result, while an area of 0.5 is a worthless result. The 
AUC point system is as follows: 0.90 - 1.00 = excellent (A); 0.80 - 0.90 = good (B); 0.70 - 0.80 
= fair (C); 0.60 - 0.70 = poor (D); and 0.50 - 0.60 = fail (F). The AUC of Android permissions is 
0.7897, and Android Intent is 0.8929. This shows that Android Intent performed better.  
The nature of AndroDialysis raises concerns about battery consumption of the device. Running 
our malware detector on the device does not consume too much battery. To address this issue, we 
measured power consumed by our application. Additionally, the measurement is performed for 
three popular applications. These applications are selected from three categories of popular 
activities: games, online social networking, and multimedia [52].  
The experiments have been conducted in a Google Nexus One smartphone. Power consumption 
has been measured by applying a battery tests involving mainly computation capabilities. The 
device was previously instrumented with AppScope [53], an energy metering framework based 
on monitoring kernel activity for Android. AppScope collects usage information from the 
monitored device and estimates the consumption of a running application using an energy model 
given by DevScope [54]. AppScope provides the amount of energy consumed by an app in the 
form of several time series, each one associated with a component of the device - CPU, Wi-Fi, 
cellular, touchscreen, etc. We restrict our measures to CPU for computations, as our tests do not 
have communications nor a graphical user interface at computation stage. Note that we do not 
require user interaction to analyze applications and, therefore, do not report measurements in any 
other component. 
Table 10 Shows outcomes of the measurement during 10 minutes of usage. The AndroDialysis 
consumes 23.25 joules for testing one application on the device. Thus, we assume a number 
N=20 for the average number of applications a user has on the device and multiply N by 23.25 
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joules. We have to mention that this is subject to the size of applications, and that although there 
might be larger apps, this measurement still gives an estimation of the power consumption. 
Table 10. Power Consumption (in Joules) of Three Popular Applications and AndroDialysis 
During 10 Minutes Usage 
Application CPU Communications Display Total 
YouTube 30.11 12.59 508.90 551.59 
MX Moto 129.24 5.75 509.54 644.52 
Facebook 137.76 27.42 471.42 637.27 
AndroDialysis 23.25 0 0 465 (23.25×20) 
 
It is necessary to discuss re-running time. The AndroDialysis should only be executed every time 
a user installs a new application. Thus, if a user installs 20 applications in a period of one month, 
our tool would consume 20 × 23.25 = 465 joules after a month, which is less than running 
YouTube application during 10 minutes. Figure 8 shows power consumption of AndroDialysis in 
Watt unit. It is worth mentioning that Joules unit is calculated using  𝐸()) =	𝑃(+) ×	𝑡(,) 
equation, where unit of power is Watt and unit of time is seconds. 
 
Figure 8. Power Consumption of AndroDialysis in our Experiment 
6. Related Works 
Many studies have been conducted to address the problem of the rapid growth of mobile 
malware. We discuss recent researches related to this paper.  
Barrera et al. [55] performed permission-based analysis on 1,100 Android applications using 
self-organizing maps algorithm. From the results, they observed that certain permissions are used 
in applications with similar pattern. They also concluded that there are pairs of permissions 
requested by some types of applications. They mentioned, however, that their analysis does not 
include any malware, and they had merely examined available applications in the market. Zhou 
et al. [56] conducted permission-based analysis, and the results show a high false positive rate of 
40%. As a result, manual analysis was conducted to reduce the false positive rate. Grace et al. 
[44] developed RiskRanker that ranks applications based on certain defined rules. If an 
application satisfies a rule, it is ranked as high, medium, or low, as the case may be. Similarly, 
Chakradeo et al. [18] introduced MAST that uses multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to 
analyze the applications attributes. They used a questionnaire and poll selection to identify 
malicious applications. RiskRanker and MAST employed rules and polls to detect malware. 
When an unknown malware appears, they need to add a new rule and poll to detect it. The rules 
might not be applicable to all known malware, as there are too many malwares in existence. 
Some researchers integrated Intent as examining features in their systems. Intent is one of eight 
feature sets that DREBIN [11] extracts for examination. It used machine-learning methods on 
feature sets to detect malicious applications. A3 [20] is another system that mentioned Intent as 
one of three extracted features. It utilized heuristic algorithm for detection. DroidMat [57] 
includes Intent in the feature sets. It extracts permission, API calls, Intent, as well as performs 
deployment of components. It then employs various machine-learning methods to evaluate 
applications and identify malicious ones. MAST [18] includes Intent extracted from 
AndroidManifest.xml file as its examining feature. As mentioned above, implicit and explicit 
Intents are as important as Intent in XML file.  
Chin et al. [38] developed a system that analyzes inter-application communications (includes 
explicit and implicit Intents) in developers’ applications for analyzing and detecting malware. 
They also guide developers on using Intents correctly to avoid attacks - application hijacking. 
Apposcopy [19] is a malware detection tool that integrates static taint analysis and Intent analysis 
(explicit and implicit) to generate a signature for applications. However, this system adopts a 
signature-based approach that is unable to detect unknown malware. Octeau et al. [58] tried to 
solve the problem of Multi-Valued Composite (MVC) constant propagation. They used COAL 
declarative language to build a solver to find all the values of complex objects that may have 
multiple fields, taking into consideration the correlations between the fields. This method can be 
applied to a wide variety of static program analyses where the range of values of objects needs to 
be determined, including Android Intent. However, attackers can simply modify their code and 
use various methods of obfuscation to mislead such systems. IccTA [59] analyzes inter-
component communications in Android applications. They include explicit and implicit Intent, 
since they are essential part of Android’s internal communication mechanisms. They focus on 
detecting applications with privacy leaks using data flow analysis. Although this approach 
outperforms similar systems, it is unable to analyze the multi-threading part of applications. It 
also consumes too much memory for analyzing some applications. Barros et al. [60] analyzed 
data flow of Intent in Android by using pattern of Android Intent in Java code as well as the 
syntax and semantics of Intent types. Since their work is dependent on data flow analysis, it is 
not immune to obfuscation methods. This approach pays little attention to analyzing explicit and 
implicit Intents; nevertheless, we believe that it is very effective for malware detection. In this 
paper, we use intelligent learner for detection. In this context, we extracted and used permission, 
explicit Intent and implicit Intent from a large dataset to produce accurate results. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we explored Android Intent – explicit and implicit - as a feature for malware 
detection, and experimented with Android permission for comparison. The results show that the 
use of Android Intent in our approach not only achieves higher detection rate, but it is also faster 
in completing the detection process. We also verified our results by experimenting on 
combination on Android Intent and Android permission, to show that these features do not 
overlap. Thus, to answer the first question, Android Intent is a plausible feature in malware 
detection. In addition, combining the simple estimator with LAGDHillClimber is the best 
configuration for Bayesian Network algorithm to achieve higher detection rate and faster 
detection. In conclusion, we declare that Android Intent is indeed more effective than Android 
permission in malware detection. As a result of this work, it behooves researchers to emphasize 
on Android Intents (explicit and implicit) for mobile malware detection. It is beneficial to 
develop new detection methods as attackers change their strategy frequently to avoid the current 
detection methods.  
We are determined to develop comprehensive methods based on this work in conjunction with 
dynamic analysis to tackle mobile malware. In addition, the graphical user interface will be 
improved to show list of applications that are considered malware, and why our application 
considers it malicious. This way, the AndroDialysis learns about applications, which makes it 
smarter. Additionally, the user will be presented with options on how to deal with malicious 
applications.  
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